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DICTA

ONE YEAR REVIEW OF COURTS, JUDGMENTS
AND PROCEDURE
By DICK

BERNICK Of

the Denver Bar

The case of Holland v. McAuliffe' dealt with an attack on Denver Ordinance No. 233, Series of 1953. The ordinance gave discretionary power to the municipal court to place a defendant
on conditional suspension of sentence or fine for a period not exceeding two years. In the event the municipal court found the
defendant to have breached the conditions of suspension it was
required to reinstate the original sentence or fine. The ordinance
also prbvided that for purposes of appeal the date of conditional
suspension was to be considered the date of final judgment.
Two months before the ordinance in question became effective
the defendant was given a fine and jail sentence. The Court suspended the jail sentence and part of the fine on condition that
defendant "refrain from driving any motor vehicle for one year
from date." More than four months later the Court issued its warrant for defendant's arrest for an alleged breach of the conditional
suspension. At the hearing the court modified and reinstated the
original sentence and then denied defendant's application to appeal
such sentence. Defendant, after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain reversal through certiorari in the Superior Court appealed
to the Supreme Court via writ of error.
The Supreme Court held the judgment of the municipal court
erroneous on the following grounds:
1 )The conditional suspension was unlawful because the
prohibition against driving was apparently worldwide
thus exceeding the court's territorial jurisdiction of the
City and County of Denver.
2) The conditional suspension was unlawful because the
one year conditional suspension exceeded the ninety day
jurisdiction of the municipal court.
3) Reinstating the sentence under an ordinance which was
enacted subsequent to the original sentence and suspension constituted unlawful retroactive procedure.
The Court held that the denial of defendant's right to appeal by
the municipal court was erroneous because the defendant had
the right to appeal either at the time of the original sentence or
at the time it was reinstated and the City could not by the ordinance in question limit appeals of municipal court cases.
In the case of French v. Haarhues-'plaintiffs in error, who were
plaintiffs in the trial court, appealed to the Supreme Court on
writ of error seeking reversal of a judgment of dismissal. The
'286 P. 2d 1107.
287 P. 2d 278.
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designation of the record included a "direction for entry of judgment" but no designation of the final judgment itself. The record
as transmitted to the Supreme Court included the order of dismissal
and the order for the entry of the judgment. The judgment itself
was not included in the record on error because the clerk either
failed to enter the judgment or failed to include it in the record
on error despite the fact that Rule 112 provides that the judgment
or part thereof to be reviewed shall be included in the record
whether designated or not. The Supreme Court dismissed the
writ of error because of the absence of a final judgment and in
doing so emphasized the responsibilities of an appealing party
saying, "The entry of a judgment upon the court's order is a
ministerial duty on the part of the clerk, but if a defeated litigant
desires a review by writ of error in this court, it is his duty to see
that the record presented here is properly prepared and completed
and contains a final judgment; otherwise dismissal will follow."
In Ferkovich v. Ferkovich' the wife brought an action for divorce and in connection therewith the Court granted her motion
for relief pendente lite, ordering her husband to make certain payments for the support of the wife and child. The wife's complaint
was dismissed and on appeal to the Supreme Court the dismissal
was affirmed. The wife subsequently moved the lower court for
a judgment in the amount of the aggregate of her husband's
delinquencies under the order pendente lite and also petitioned
for her costs and counsel fees in the Supreme Court. The lower
court denied the motion for judgment and ruled that it had no
jurisdiction to grant the petition for costs and fees in the Supreme
Court.
On appeal both rulings were reversed. The Supreme Court
held the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
expenditures in connection with the Supreme Court review and
therefore had erred when it denied the petition on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. It was held to be error for the trial court
to refuse to enter judgment for the past due support installments
since those installments constituted a debt against the husband
3274 P. 2d 602.
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and the trial court was without authority to enter an order which,
in effect, would be a cancellation of the payments in default.
It is interesting to note, in connection with the case of French
v. Haarhues, above, that the husband here contended that the writ
of error should be dismissed because the orders appealed from
were not final judgments. The court dispensed with this argument by saying, ".

.

. the orders were in every respect a finality

so far as plaintiff's rights were concerned."
Carrerav. Kelley' was the latest in a line of cases emphasizing
the limited jurisdiction of county courts in dependency matters.
The mother, faced with the necessity of working, had placed the
child in the care of petitioner. The petition in dependency alleged
that for a period of about one year prior to the time the petition
was filed the petitioner had provided the entire care and support
of the child. The trial court found that the child was dependent
and neglected and that the custody of the child was vested in
the court. An order was entered whereby the child was to spend
about nine months of the year with petitioner and three months
of the year with the mother. The order set out certain conditions
and payments the mother was to meet over a period of two years
after which period, if she fully complied with the terms of the
order, the custody was to be vested in her. The Supreme Court,
in a sharply worded opinion, ruled that the petition itself showed
that the child was not a dependent or neglected child under the
terms of the statute. It was held that there was no showing that
the child was neglected or imposed upon, because, on the contrary, the petition showed the child was being cared for by
petitioner. For this reason it was held that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the child.
The case of Miller v. Singer3 was an action in which the complaint and evidence charged the defendants as joint tortfeasors.
The trial court instructed the jury that joint tortfeasors were
"jointly and separately liable" instead of the usual "jointly and
severally liable." The trial court then submitted two forms of
verdict by which the jury was permitted to and did in fact return
separate verdicts in different amounts against various defendants.
The Supreme Court held that the above instruction and the approval of the verdict in separate amounts constituted error, reciting
the general rule that, "Where an action is brought against joint
tortfeasors, if . . . the finding is against all of them, the verdict

must be a single verdict against all for a single sum and not a
several verdict against each defendant either for the same or
separate sums."
In the case of People v. Griffith' the defendant was arrested
and taken into custody without a warrant and an information
was filed against him in the County Court charging him with
'263 P. 2d 162.
279 P. 2d 846.
e276 P. 2d 559.
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driving while under the influence of liquor, speeding and leaving
the scene of an accident. The defendant moved for dismissal,
relying on Sec. 290, Ch. 16, '35 C.S.A. which directed that in
cases concerning the offenses with which he was charged "the
arrested person shall be immediately taken before a magistrate."
The defendant argued 1) that the County Court had no jurisdiction over the charges made against him because the above
quoted portion of Section 290 conferred exclusive jurisdiction
on justice of the peace courts, and 2) that County Court had no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant since he was arrested without warrant and was not taken immediately before
a magistrate. The County Court dismissed the information and
the State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal
holding that the language of Section 290 did not repeal the statute
conferring original jurisdiction upon county courts in misdemeanor cases, and that even if the arrest was illegal it did not
deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
The case of National Motor Finance Co. v. DeMarcol involved
an attempted appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace
court to the county court. Instead of filing an appeal bond substantially in the form prescribed by statute (C.R.S. 1953 79-13-13),
counsel for the appealing party filed his check and a petition
for supersedeas. The petition for supersedeas did not contain
certain information required in the statutory form of appeal bond,
7287 P. 2d 265.

Back of Colorado Real Estate Investment Since 1898

Jan.-Feb., 1956

DICTA

such as the name of the justice of the peace and the date of the
justice court judgment. The Supreme Court held that the County
Court never obtained jurisdiction, on two grounds:
1) A litigant cannot deposit money or a check as security
for the prosecution of an appeal, instead of entering
into an undertaking where the statute prescribes the
form of the bond.
2) The petition was lacking in essential allegations, and
the deficiency was not satisfied by any subsequent
happenings.
The case is also significant for the Court's statement that the
defendant's appeal bond in a justice court replevin action must
be in an amount at least equal to the established value of the propperty replevined and costs. The statutory form of appeal bond
prescribes a bond in double the amount of judgment and costs.
In the case of American Furniture Company of Denver v.
Veazie8 the buyer brought an action against the seller of a gas stove
to recover damages for injuries she sustained as a result of the
explosion of the stove. The complaint contained two causes of
action for the same injury; one upon the basis of implied warranty of fitness, and one based on negligence. The court submitted three forms of verdict to the jury; one for the plaintiff
on her first cause, one for the plaintiff on her second cause and
one for the defendant, with the instruction that the jury should
return but one verdict. The jury returned two verdicts for the
plainiff, one on each claim, which verdicts were accepted by the
court. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment on
the proposition that plaintiff was not entitled to recover on two
theories for one injury.
In its opinion the Court suggests that the trial court should
have submitted two forms of verdict for the first cause of action,
one for the plaintiff and one for the defendant, and two forms of
verdict for the second cause of action.
A somewhat related situation was presented in the case of
Hood v. The People.' In that case three counts of an information
were submitted to the jury. The court submitted three separate
forms of guilty verdict, one on each count, and but one form of
not guilty verdict. The defendant was found guilty on one count
and on appeal argued that the trial court erred in not submitting
separate forms of not guilty verdict as to each count. The Supreme Court held in this case that submitting three forms of not
guilty verdict would have been mere surplusage and that no error
was committed.
s281 P. 2d 803.
g 2 7 7 P. 2d 223.
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In the case of Rinn v. City of Boulder 0 the defendant was
found guilty in Police Court of violations of Boulder municipal
ordinances and the defendant appealed to the County Court. The
defendant filed various motions and a request for a jury trial.
The motions were denied and the defendant was allowed ten
days in which to file an answer. The defendant failed to answer
and the County Court dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court
held that the dismissal was error.
The opinion holds that no answer is required in such a case
because the issues are framed by the perfection of the appeal
from the Police Court and the County Court merely tries de novo
the issues made in Police Court.
In the case of Dickerson v. Cary'" the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants to foreclose a defaulted deed of trust.
The defendants had previously commenced an action in another
court asking damages for fraud in connection with the same sale
contract in which the deed of trust was given. On defendant's
motion the court stayed the plaintiff's foreclosure proceedings
indefinitely or until disposition of the damage suit. On appeal
it was held that the stay was improperly granted since the defendants had acknowledged their liability when they elected to
sue for damages rather than recission of the contract. The opinion
also held that the stay was erroneous because the disposition of
one action would not determine all of the issues of the other and
the suits were therefore not identical.
In Trujillo v. District Court 2 the petitioner was charged with
the misdemeanor of involuntary manslaughter. Bail was set at
$2000.00 and petitioner was released on bond. Upon the return of
a guilty verdict the court, on its own motion, ordered the petitioner remanded to custody, discharged the bond and denied his
motion to remain on bond until the disposition of his motion for
a new trial.
The petitioner then brought an original proceeding in the
Supreme Court for a ruling upon the District Court to show
cause why he should not be released on bond. The order to show
cause was issued and in response thereto the District Court filed
an answer setting out that the admission to bond after verdict
was a discretionary matter and that it was the settled policy of
the court to refuse all bonds after conviction and before sentence
in such cases. The Supreme Court agreed that whether the bond
should be allowed to remain in effect after verdict was a discretionary matter, but held that following a rigid policy regardless
........
a
or circiunstances did not constitute an exercise of
discretion. Since the undisputed facts were that the petitioner
had lived in the state all his life, and not one scintilla of evidence
10280

P. 2d 1111.
U285 P. 2d 831.
282 P. 2d 703.
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adverse to his reputation and character had been brought out in
his trial, the District Court was ordered to reinstate the bond.
In the case of Maniatis v. Stiny" an action for accounting in
District Court was referred to a master and trial was held before
the master. The master made his report and objections thereto
were filed by the defendant. The nature of the objections were
such that the District Court could not properly pass upon them
without a reporter's transcript of the evidence introduced before
the master. However, no such transcript was supplied for the
judge's information in ruling on the objections. The judgment was
reversed on the ground that the trial court lacked authority to pass
upon the defendant's exceptions without examining the evidence
taken before the master.
The case of Smith v. Wagner14 was really an affirmance of the
lower court without an opinion except to correct an obvious
mathematical miscalculation in the judgment. In so doing the
Supreme Court reenunciated the familiar rule that the trial court,
having seen and heard the witnesses testify, is the best judge of
their credibility and therefore its findings upon conflicting testimony are presumed to be correct and may not be disturbed except
to correct manifest miscalculation.-D. B.

M274

P. 2d 975.
1279 P. 2d 1057.
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The Dicta staff wishes to announce that commencing with the
1956 March-April Issue, a picture of the author and a biographical
sketch will be published with each article. It is requested that all
future contributors of material include a 5x7 photograph and a
"brief" biographical sketch with their articles. Persons who have
previously submitted material which has not yet been published
will be contacted individually by the Student Article Editor for
their pictures and sketches.
ARNOLD M. CHUTKOW, Editor

